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Abstract— We study the design of decision making mecha-
nism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a
dynamic environment. Agents’ privately observed preference
over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic
due to adoption of stopping rules. The proposed model designs
the rules of encounter for agents participating in the dynamic
mechanism by specifying an allocation rule and three payment
rules to elicit agents’ coupled decision makings of honest pref-
erence reporting and optimal stopping over multiple periods.
The mechanism provides a special posted-price payment rule
that depends only on each agent’s realized stopping time to
directly influence the population dynamics. This letter focuses
on the theoretical implementability of the rules in perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and characterizes necessary and
sufficient conditions to guarantee agents’ honest equilibrium
behaviors over periods. We provide the design principles to
construct the payments in terms of the allocation rules and
identify the restrictions of the designer’s ability to influence
the population dynamics. The established conditions make the
designer’s problem of finding multiple rules to determining an
optimal allocation rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent sequential decision making is an important
research agenda in engineering (e.g., [1]), economics (e.g.,
[2]), and Artificial Intelligence (AI) (e.g., [3]). In many
scenarios, agents act on behalf of individuals or organizations
and the multi-agent system needs to represent their prefer-
ences, embody the knowledge about the environment, and
behave according to their rationality in decision makings.
Mechanism design approaches have been used to design
the rules of encounters for the multi-agent systems to elicit
actions, allocate resources, manage the cooperation, and rule
the competition in heterogeneous environment where each
agent is self-interested (e.g., [4], [5]).
This letter considers a dynamic multi-agent resource allo-
cation mechanism, in which there is one central planner (CP)
that aims to allocate resources periodically to agents based
on their private preferences. The mechanism is characterized
by an allocation rule and three payment rules that specify
allocation and payment to each agent at each period based
on their preference. The multiple self-interested agents strate-
gically report their preferences to the CP and choose a time
to stop over periods. Each agent’s preference evolves over
time due to the learning-by-doing, which captures the effects
of experiences (i.e., historical preferences and allocations) on
agent’s preference. The population is dynamic due to agent’s
stochastic departure by the adoption of the stopping rule.
† Both authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, New York, USA, 11201,
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To directly influence the population dynamics, one of the
payment rules is a posted-price rule that depends only on
the realized stopping time of each agent.
We are interested in a class of direct mechanisms in
which agents are incentivized to truthfully report their true
preferences (i.e., incentive compatibility) and focus on the
theoretical implementability of the mechanism when each
agent strategically makes the reporting and the stopping
decisions simultaneously. Revelation principle allows the CP
to focus on the direct mechanisms to replicate equilibrium
outcomes of indirect mechanisms (see, e.g., [6]). Agents’
adoption of stopping rule, however, complicates the guaran-
tee of implementability in the dynamic environment due to
the coupling of agents’ reporting strategy and stopping deci-
sion in the strategic reasoning about their self interests. The
consideration of behavior elicitations when each agent makes
simultaneous multiple decisions that depend on their private
information over periods distinguishes this work from other
mechanism design problems that consider only the reporting
decisions (e.g., [7], [8]) and optimal stopping problems that
involve no truthful revealing of private information (e.g., [9],
[10]).
We introduce the notion of honesty elicitation (HE) con-
straint that guarantees the incentive compatibility and elicits
optimal stopping behaviors of agents. The honesty of the
reporting can obviate agents’ strategic reasoning and simplify
the dynamic decision makings. At each period, the HE
constraint requires a guarantee of no profitable deviations
from honesty at current period as well as agents’ planned
future behaviors. This multi-dimensional analysis is simpli-
fied by establishing a one-shot deviation principle that pro-
vides necessity and sufficiency of single-period truthfulness
to imply multi-period honesty. We provide necessary and
sufficient conditions to guarantee the implementability of the
HE constraint in perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE-
HI) and propose design principles to construct the payment
rules in terms of the allocation rule. Despite its independence
of agent’ preference, we observe that the ability of the CP to
control the population dynamics is limited due to the design
restrictions of the posted-price payment rule in PBNE-HI
mechanism.
We are interested in multi-agent sequential decision-
making problems, in which self-interested agents want to
obtain a resource that is allocated by a third party, called
central planner (CP, she). We consider a dynamic population
environment, in which the population evolves over time due
to each agent’s local decision of whether to continue or
not by adopting an optimal stopping rule. The resource is
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allocated among the agents periodically. Time is discrete and
indexed by t ∈ T = {0, . . . ,T}. Suppose there are n agents
entering the resource allocation model. Let I = {1, . . . ,n} be
the set of agent indices. The CP is indexed as agent 0.
Information structure. The information structure of the
environment is described by a tuple < X,F0 >. Here, X =
×i∈I,t∈TXi,t is the joint set of agent’s preferences, with
Xi,t ≡ [xi,t , x¯i,t ], with −∞ < xi,t < x¯i,t < ∞, as the period-t
set of agent i’s preference, and F0 = {Fi,0}i∈I is the set of
distributions of agent’s initial preferences. We assume that
each agent’s preference is independent from each other at
each period. Each agent i’s period-t preference xi,t is his
own private information that is unobservable to all other
agents and the CP. Each agent i (he) report his period-t
preference by using a reporting strategy, αi,t : Xi,t 7→Xi,t , such
that x˜i,t = αi,t(xi,t) is reported to the CP given xi,t as his true
preference. Meanwhile, agent i decides whether to stop or
continue by adopting a stopping time rule ζi, which will be
elaborated later in the letter. Notationally, let xi = {xi,t}t∈T,
xti = {xi,s}ts=0, and x˜ is treated analogously.
Take-it-or-leave-it. At the ex-ante stage, i.e., prior to t =
0, the CP provides a take-it-or-leave-it offer to agents by
specifying <σi,t ,ρi,t ,γi,t ,βi,t > to each agent i, for each t ∈T.
Let Ai,t be the set of period-t resource for agent i. Here, σi,t :
Xi,t ×X−i,t 7→ Ai,t is the period-t allocation rule for agent i,
such that he receives ai,t = σi,t(x˜i,t , x˜−i,t) when he reports x˜i,t
and others x˜−i,t . ρi,t : Xi,t 7→ R is agent i’s period-t payment
rule, such that pi,t = ρi,t(x˜i,t , x˜−i,t) is paid to him when he
decides to continue, given his report x˜i,t and others’ x˜−i,t .
γi,t : Xi,t ×X−i,t 7→ R is the terminal payment rule and βi,t :
T 7→R is the posted-price terminal payment rule that specify
the payment pi,t = γi,t(x˜i,t , x˜−i,t)+βi,t(t) for agent i at t when
he reports x˜i,t , decides to stop, and others report x˜−i,t . The
posted-price βi,t is independent of agent’s preference.
Learning-by-doing. Each agent updates his preference at
the beginning of each period due to his learning-by-doing
that leads to stochastic dynamics of the preference. The
environment is dynamic due to agents’ learning-by-doing and
the population evolutions. We assume that the dynamics of
agent i’s preference are governed by a Markovian stochastic
process uniquely characterized by σi, αi, and a set of
transition kernels Ki = {Ki,t}t∈T, where Ki,t : Xi,t−1×Ai,t−1 7→
∆(Xi,t) (here, ∆(X) denotes the set of probability measures
over X .). Denote agent i’s stochastic process by Γi[σi,αi,Ki].
Let Fi,t(·|xi,t−1,ai,t−1) : Xi,t 7→ [0,1] be the cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) corresponding to Ki,t , with density
function fi,t . We assume fi,t(xi,t)> 0, for all xi,t ∈ Xi,t , i ∈ I,
t ∈ T. Given any xti , we define agent i’s interim process
Γi,t [σi,αi,Ki;xti ] that consists of t periods of realized xti and
stochastic process starting from t + 1 uniquely defined by
σi,αi,Ki, and xti . Let ωi,t be uniformly distributed from (0,1).
Let κi,t be defined as follows:
κi,t(xi,t−1,ai,t−1,ωi,t) = F−1i,t (ωi,t |xi,t−1,ai,t−1), (1)
where F−1i,t is the inverse of Fi,t defined as
F−1i,t (ωi,t |xi,t−1,ai,t−1) = inf{xi,t : Fi,t(xi,t |xi,t−1,ai,t−1)≥ωi,t}.
Let xˆi,t denote the random variable and xi,t is one sample of
xˆi,t and define ωˆi,t analogously. Hence, the dynamics of xi,t
can be described by κi,t as, given xi,t−1 and ai,t−1,
xˆi,t = κi,t(xi,t−1,ai,t−1, ωˆi,t), (2)
i.e., if ωi,t is uniformly distributed over (0,1), then xˆi,t is
distributed according to Ki,t(xi,t−1,ai,t−1). The population
evolution is another factor that causes the dynamics, due to
agents’ adoption of a stopping rule that leads to a weakly
decreasing population. Each agent i decides whether to stop
or not at each period after observing his preference and sends
his stopping decision with his report to the CP.
Conventions. To describe the dynamic population, let
It = {1, . . . ,nt}, with 1 ≤ nt ≤ n0 = n be the set of period-t
participating agent indices. Let et represent general agent
index in It and let it ∈ It denote agent i’s (i ∈ I0 = I)
period-t index. Let σ = {σi,t}i∈I,t∈T, σ t = {σi,t}i∈I , and
σi = {σi,t}t∈T; Analogous treatments can be conducted for
A, α , ρ , γ , and β . To simplify the notation, we omit the
time index t in subscript, e.g., xit ≡ xit ,t . Let Tt,t+k = {t, t+
1, . . . , t + k} with Tt = Tt,T . We only show the allocation
rule σ and reporting strategy α , i.e., Et
[ · |αi,σi] (resp.
E
[ · |αi,σi]), to represent the expectation taken under the
process Γi,t [σi,αi,Ki;xti ] (resp. Γi[σi,αi,Ki]). Table I lists the
notations.
TABLE I: Summary of Notations
xit ∈ Xit agent it ’s period-t preference
αit agent it ’s reporting strategy
σit allocation rule for agent it at t
ρit intermediate payment rule
γit , βit terminating payment rules
Kit transition kernel
Et [·|αi,σi] period-t interim expectation given αi, σi
E[·|αi,σi] ex-ante expectation given αi, σi
Ci and Cit agent i’s ex-ante and period-t interim expected payoff
ζ ∗it optimal stopping rule
τ ∗ = {τ∗it } set of first-passage time
superscript S or S¯ stop or continue
dYit (·, ·;σi) distance function, Y ∈ {S, S¯}
φYit (·|σi) characterizing function, driving the PBNE-HI analysis
II. DECISION-MAKING MODEL
Let τ t = {τet}et∈It be any joint set of time horizon of
agents participating at period t. Let uit : Xit × Ait be the
instantaneous utility (utility) function such that uit (xit ,ait )
gives the period-t utility of agent it , given his true preference
xit , report x˜it , and other agents’ reports x˜−it . Define the
period-t interim expected payoff of agent i, given αi, <
σi,ρi >, and the interim process Γi,t , as follows
Cit (xit ,τi;αi,σi)≡ E
[ τi−1
∑
s=0
uis
(
xˆis ,σis(αs(xˆs))
)
+ρis(αs(xˆs))
+uiτi
(
xˆiτi ,σiτi (ατi(xˆτi))
)
+ γiτi (ατi(xˆτi))+βiτi (τi)
∣∣αi,σi],
(3)
where xˆs = {xˆis ,{xˆes}es∈Is\{is}}. Similarly, we can define the
ex-ante expected payoff of agent i, given αi, < σi,ρi,γi,β >,
and the stochastic process Γi, as
Ci(τi;αi,σi)≡ E
[ τi−1
∑
s=0
uis
(
xˆis ,σis(αs(xˆs))
)
+ρis(αs(xˆs))
+uiτi
(
xˆiτi ,σiτi (ατi(xˆτi))
)
+ γiτi (ατi(xˆτi))+βiτi (τi)
∣∣αi,σi].
(4)
The reasoning process for the agents induced by the mech-
anism and the dynamic environment can be characterized
by an incomplete-information game. In this game, an agent
only observes his preference by himself and reports it only
to the CP. Each agent i’s period-t knowledge about other
agents’ preference is based on his realized allocations ati and
the priors about the stochastic of others’ preferences, i.e.,
F−i,0 and K−i. In this work, we consider a direct mechanism
(e.g., [11]), in which each agent i finds it is his best interest
to report his preference truthfully at each period t, i.e.,
xit = αit (xit ), for all t ∈ T. The solution concept for the
game is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE), in which
each agent reports truthfully at each period given the belief
that all other agents report truthfully. Let bit : Xit−1×Ait−1 7→
∆(X−it−1) denote agent it ’s belief about other agents’ realized
preferences x−it−1 given x˜it−1 , and ait−1 , with µit (·|x˜it−1 ,ait−1)
as the corresponding density function. Let α∗i = {α∗it} be
agent i’s truthful reporting strategy, i.e., α∗it (xit ) = xit , for all
xit ∈ Xit , t ∈ T. PBNE is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (PBNE) Given the mechanism < σ ,ρ ,γ ,β >,
the game of the agents admits a PBNE if, for all xit ∈ Xit ,
τit ∈ Tt , t ∈ T
α∗i = argαi maxCit (xit ,τit ;αi,σi), (5)
and the belief bit is updated according Bayes’ rule by
receiving < xit ,ait >, i.e.,
µit+1(x−it+1 |xit ,ait )
=
µit (x−it−1 |xit−1 ,ait−1)f−i(x−it |x−it−1 ,ait−1)
∑
x′−it−1∈X−it−1 ,
x′−it∈X−it
µit (x′−it−1 |xit−1 ,ait−1)f−i(x′−it |x−it−1 ,ait−1)
,
(6)
where x−it−1 and ait−1 in the update of bit are the esti-
mated by agent i. When the denominator of (6) become
0, µit+1(x−it+1 |xit ,ait ) is updated by assigning any possible
value.
Since each agent’s preference is independently distributed
within each period, agent i can have a belief about each
other individual agent’s preference based on Bayes’ rule in
the similar way.
A. Optimal Stopping
Fix a truthful α∗i . For the convenience of notations, we
omit the dependence on the reporting strategy when an
agent reports truthfully, e.g., Ci(τi;σi) =Ci(τi;α∗i ,σi), unless
otherwise stated. Agent i’s stopping rule ζi is optimal if there
exists a τ∗i such that, for a given < σi,ρi,γi,βi >,
sup
τ∈T
Ci(τi;αi,σi) =Ci(τ∗i ;αi,σi). (7)
Define
Vit (xit ;σi)≡ sup
τi∈Tt
Cit (τi;σi).
Assumption 1. For all xit ∈ Xit , t ∈ T, E
[
sup
τi∈Tt
∣∣Cit (τi;σi)∣∣]
< ∞.
Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Backward induction yields,
Vit (xit ;σi) = max
(
Cit (xit , t;σi), E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;σi)
∣∣σi]),
(8)
with ViT (xiT ;σi) = CiT (T ;σi). Let the stopping rule ζit be
defined as
ζit :∃z ∈ T, s.t.,
z = inf{t ∈ T : Vit (xiT ;σi) =Cit (xit , t;σi),xit ∈ Xit}.
(9)
It has been shown that the stopping rule (9) is optimal (see,
e.g., Theorem 1.9 of [12]), i.e., it solves problem (7). By ζ ∗i ,
we denote the optimal stopping rule given in (9).
B. PBNE Honestly Implementable
To successfully elicit agents’ honest behaviors that admit
a PBNE, we require an honesty elicitation (HE) constraint
that (1) guarantees incentive compatibility and (2) maintains
optimality of stopping rule. We define the implementability
of our mechanism in the following definition.
Definition 2. (PBNE-HI) The mechanism < σ ,ρ ,γ ,β >
satisfies PBNE-honesty implementable (PBNE-HI) if, for all
reporting strategy αi, all it ∈ It , t ∈ T, the following honesty
elicitation (HE) constraint is satisfied:
max
(
Cit (xit , t;σi), E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;σi)
∣∣σi])
≥max
(
Cit (xit , t;αi,σi), E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;αi,σi)
∣∣αi,σi]),
(10)
with CiT (xiT ,T ;σi) ≥ CiT (xiT ,T ;αi,σi), and each agent be-
lieves that all other agents report truthfully all the time with
probability 1 and updates his belief according to (6).
The condition (10) captures the coupling of each agent i’
reporting decision and stopping decision. It elicits truthful
reporting strategy α∗i that is optimal at every period t and
the optimal stopping behavior according to ζ ∗i . That is, the
condition (10) imposes that it is each agent i’s best interest to
report truthfully at every period and make stopping decisions
according to ζ ∗i .
Given the mechanism rules, agent i’s decision makings at
each period t to maximizing Cit requires the evaluation of
future payoffs, which is determined by his current reporting
strategy, his planned future reporting strategies, and the time
horizon τit . One the one hand, any {αis}ts ⊂ αi determines
(a set of) time horizon τ ′it ∈ Tt such that Cit (xit ,τ ′it ;αi,σi) =
maxτi Cit (xit ,τit ;αi,σi). On the other hand, any time horizon
τit ∈ Tt can pin down (a set of) optimal reporting strategy
{α ′is}ts ⊂ α ′i that maximizes Cit , i.e., Cit (xit ,τit ;α ′i ,σi) =
maxαi Cit (xit ,τit ;αi,σi). Additionally, agent i’s current report-
ing strategy αit directly determines the immediate payoff and
also indirectly affects the distribution of his future prefer-
ences which influence the expected future payoffs through
the given mechanism rules. Hence, condition (10) requires
multi-dimensional guarantees.
Let α˜i,(t) = {α˜is}s∈T be any reporting strategy that differs
from α∗i only at period-t, (see it as one-shot deviation
reporting strategy at period t) i.e., α˜is =α∗is , for all s∈T\{t}.
To emphasize the one shot deviation, in the rest of this
letter we use x˜it = α˜it (xt) to denote the adoption of α˜i,(t)
unless otherwise stated. We simplify the condition (10) by
establishing a one-shot deviation principle.
Proposition 1. The mechanism < σ ,ρ ,γ ,β > is PBNE-HI
if and only if there is no one-shot reporting strategy α˜i,(t)
with x˜it = α˜it (xt) at any period t ∈ T, it ∈ It ,
max
(
Cit (xit , t;σi), E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;σi)
∣∣σi])
≥max
(
Cit (xit , t; x˜it ,σi), E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ; x˜it ,σi)
∣∣x˜it ,σi]),
(11)
with CiT (xiT ,T ;σi)≥CiT (xiT ,T ; x˜iT ,σi).
Proof. See Appendix A.
At each period t, agent i’s reasoning about choosing
stopping time characterized by a stopping rule is independent
of the reporting strategy; however, the stopping decision
according to ζ ∗i is coupled with the current reporting strategy.
Let
τ∗it (xit ;αit ) = inf{τ ∈ T : τ ∈ argτ ′∈Tt Cit (τ ′;αit ,σi)}. (12)
Clearly, when τ∗it (xit ;αit ) = t, it is optimal for agent i to
stop at t given his true preference xit and period-t reporting
strategy αit . Hence, for a given stopping rule, agent i’s any
reporting strategy α ′it has an associated τ
∗
it (xit ;α
′
it ) for each
observed preference xit and the optimal reporting strategy α ′′it
is given as, α ′′it = argαit maxCit (τ
∗
it (xit ;αit );αit ,σi). HE con-
straint elicits the truthful reporting α∗i and optimal stopping
rule ζ ∗i as the optimal decision rules for each agent i in any
PBNE-HI mechanism. The analysis in the rest of this letter
will focus on one-shot deviation report strategies.
C. Threshold Rule
Next, we introduce an important class of stopping rules
that is based on a threshold rule (see, e.g., [13], [14]). Define,
for all τi ∈ Tt+1,
git (xit ,τi; x˜it ,σi)
≡E
[
Cit+1(xˆit+1τi; x˜it ,σi)|σi
]
−Cit (xit , t; x˜it ,σi)+βit (t),
(13)
with git (xit ; x˜it ,σi) = git (xit ,τ ′i ; x˜it ,σi), where τ ′i =
argτi∈Tt+1 supE
[
Cit+1(xˆit+1τi;σi)|σi
]
.
From the definition of the optimal stopping rule ζ ∗i , we
can define a stopping region as follows:
Dit (t)≡ {xit ∈ Xit : git (xit ;σi)≤ βit (t))}. (14)
We consider the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. The difference of expected payoff between
stopping at the next period t+1 and at the current period t,
Cit (xit , t + 1;σi)−Cit (xit , t;σi), is non-decreasing in xit , for
all t ∈ T.
Let εi : T 7→ Xit be the threshold function, such that agent
it decides to stop at period t if xit ≤ εi(t). Since all agents
stop at the final period T , we make εi(T ) = x¯it . The optimal
threshold (stopping) rule is defined as follows:
ζ εi :∃z ∈ T, s.t., z = inf{t ∈ T : xit ≤ εi(t)}. (15)
We establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 3 holds. In PBNE-HI
mechanism < σ ,ρ ,γ ,β >, each agent i’s optimal stopping
rule is a threshold rule, i.e., ζi = ζ εi with a unique threshold
function εi, for all i ∈ I.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 implies that the threshold function εi can be
characterized by the posted-price rule βi, and vice versa. The
following lemma follows Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. Fix truthful α∗i . Given αi,ρi, and βi, we have
βit (t) = git (εi(t);σi).
Lemma 1 is based on the monotonicity of git and the
stopping region defined in (14).
D. CP’s Problem
The CP’s design problem requires the estimation of pop-
ulation dynamics. Without loss of generality, we assume
the indices in It are ordered according to the magnitude
of τ∗et (xet ) given in (12). Specifically, let et , e
′
t ∈ It . Then,
et < e′t if τ∗et (xet ) > τ
∗
et (xe′t ). When τ
∗
et (xet ) = τ
∗
et (xe′t ), the
relative order is determined according to the order in the
previous period. For simplicity, we introduce the index
mapping pit : It−1 7→ It such that it = pit(it−1) based on the
aforementioned ordering rules. If agent et leaves at t, then
pit(et) 6∈ It+1. Let τ ∗ = {τ∗i }i∈I denote the mean first passage
time or expected stopping time evaluated at the ex-ante stage.
The calculation of τ ∗ = {τ∗i }i∈I is beyond the scope of
this letter and interested reader may refer to e.g., [15]. Let
ISt ≡ {it ∈ It : pit+1(it) 6∈ It+1} (i.e., set of period-t leaving
agents), IS¯t ≡ It\ISt , and T\τ ≡ Tmaxτ\τ for any set τ ∈ Tnt .
Furthermore, denote xSt ≡{xit}it∈ISt and x
S¯
t = xt\xSt . The CP’s
design problem is to maximize the following constrained
expected payoff at ex-ante by determining < σ ,ρ ,γ ,β >:
max
σ ,ρ ,γ ,β
C0 = E
[
∑
t∈T\τ∗
u0,t
(
xˆt ,σ t(xˆt)−ρ t(xˆt)
)
− ∑
τ∈τ ∗
(
∑
eτ∈IS¯τ
ρet (xˆet )+ ∑
eτ∈IS¯τ
(
γeτ (xˆτ )+βeτ (τ)
))]
,
s.t. PBNE-HI
(PC) Ci(τi;σ)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I,
(16)
where (PC), which stands for participation constraint, in-
centivizes agents to participate. In the following section, we
characterize the PBNE-HI and provide design principle for
honesty elicitation rules.
III. CHARACTERIZING THE HONESTY ELICITATION
In this section, we characterize the honesty elicitation
constraint of PBNE-HI given in (11). First, we introduce
the notion of distance function, defined as follows: for any
xit , yit ∈ Xit , x−it ∈ X−it , it ∈ It , t ∈ T,
dSit (yit ,xit ;σi)≡uit (yit ,σit (yit ,x−it ))−uit (xit ,σit (yit ,x−it )),
(17)
and, for any τit ∈ Tt ,
dS¯it (yit ,xit ,τit ;σit )≡ maxτ∈Tτit
βτ(τ)
+Et
[ τit
∑
s=0
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))+ γiτit (xˆiτit , xˆ−iτit )|σi
]∣∣∣
xˆit=yit
−Et
[ τit
∑
s=0
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))+ γiτit (xˆiτit , xˆ−iτit )|yit ,σi
]∣∣∣
xˆit=xit
,
(18)
where the superscripts S and S¯ represent stop and non-stop,
respectively. Basically, the distance function dSit (yit ,xit ;σi)
(resp. dS¯it (yit ,xit ;τit ,σi)) represents the change in agent i’s
expected utilities if he keeps reporting yit when his true
preferences are yit and xit , and he stops at period t (resp.
plan to stop at τit in the future).
Let φ Sit (·|σi) : Xit 7→ R and φ S¯it (·|σi) : Xit 7→ R be the
characterizing functions of agent i that are modeled by the
allocation rule σi. Note that the input of φ Sit and φ
S¯
it is the
agent’s report. Let φ y,zit (yit ,xit |σi) = φ
y
it (yit |σi)− φ zit (xit |σi),
with φ y,zit (xit |σi) = φ
y
it (xit |σi)− φ zit (xit |σi), for y,z ∈ {S, S¯}.
Construct the payment rules < ρi,γi,βi > in terms of the
characterizing functions as follows:
ρit (xit ,x−it ) =φ
S¯
it (xit |σi)−Et
[
φ S¯it+1(xˆit+1 |σi)|σi
]
−uit (xit ,σit (xit ,x−it )),
(19)
γit (xit ,x−it ) = φ
S
it (xit |σi)−uit (xit ,σit (xit ,x−it )). (20)
βit (t) = E
[T−1
∑
s=t
φ S,S¯is+1(xˆis+1 ∨ εi(s+1))
−φ S,S¯is (xˆis ∨ εi(s))
∣∣∣xit = εi(t),σi].
(21)
We obtain a sufficient condition for PBNE-HI in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. The mechanism < σ ,ρ ,γ ,β > is PBNE-HI
if ρit and γit are constructed in (19) and (20), respectively,
and the characterizing functions satisfying the following
conditions: for all xit , yit ∈ Xit , it ∈ It , and t ∈ T,
dSit (yit ,xit |σi)≥ φ S,Sit (yit ,xit |σi), (22)
sup
τit∈Tt+1
{
dS¯it (yit ,xit ,τi;σi)
}
≥φ S¯,S¯it (yit ,xit |σi), (23)
φ S¯,Sit (xit |σi)≥ 0, with φ
S¯,S
iT (xiT |σi) = 0. (24)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The construction (19) implies that the period-t non-
stopping instantaneous payoff is set to be the difference
between the period-t φ S¯it and the expected period-t +1 φ
S¯
it+1
when the xit is reported at t. The construction (20) implies
that the period-t stopping instantaneous payoff is set to be
the period-t φ Sit . The posted-price rule βit is constructed in
(21) is independent of realized preferences. The explicit
formulations of φ Sit and φ
S¯
it can be pinned down by the
necessity of PBNE-HI. The following theorem establishes
a necessary and sufficient condition for PBNE-HI.
Define an auxiliary function
Jit (xit ,τit ;σi)≡uit (xit ,σit (xit ,xit ))+ γit (xit ,σit (xit ,xit ))
+βit (τit )1{τit=t}+git (xit ,τi;σi)1{τit>t},
(25)
where 1{·} is the indicator function.
We obtain a first-order condition for PBNE-HI in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. In any PBNE-HI mechanism, each <
σi,ρi,γi,βi > satisfies
∂Jit (`,τit ;σi)
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
=−Et
[ τit
∑
s=t
∂uis(`,σis(xˆs))
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xˆis
s
∏
k=t+1
−∂Fik (xˆik |`,σik−1(xˆk−1))
fik (xˆik |xˆik−1 ,σik−1(xˆk−1))∂`
∣∣∣
`=xik−1
∣∣∣σi].
(26)
Proof. See Appendix D.
The following theorem establishes a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for PBNE-HI.
Theorem 1. Any mechanism < σ ,ρ ,γ ,β > is PBNE-HI
if and only if the ρit and γit are given in (19) and (20),
respectively, and the characterizing functions satisfy, for any
arbitrary fixed xδit ∈ Xit , all xit ∈ Xit , any εi, it ∈ It , t ∈ T,
φ Sit (xit ) =
∫ xit
xδit
hit (t, `;σi)d`, (27)
and
φ S¯it (xit ) = sup
τit∈Tt
∫ xit
xδit
hit (τit , `;σi)d`, (28)
where hit (τit ,x;σi) =
∂Jit (`,τit ;σi)
∂` |`=x.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The condition in Theorem 1 specifies the constructions of
φ Si and φ
S¯
i in terms of σi. The term hit (τit ,xit ;σi) captures
the impact of marginal change of xit on the expected (future)
payoff with horizon τit ∈ Tt , based on the necessity of
PBNE-HI. Here, φ S¯it can be interpreted as the maximum
advantage of the agent i with period-t true preference xit
has over some arbitrary xδit , due to the CP’s not knowing
that agent i’s true xit , when he looks into the future. φ S¯it can
be interpreted analogously, When agent i decides to stop at t.
If a σ?i with a fixed xδit satisfies the necessary and sufficient
conditions, constructing the payment rules based on (19)-
(21) leads to a PBNE-HI mechanism. Furthermore, the same
σ?i also satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition for
any other fixed x˜δit but with different payment rules due to
the dependence of φ Sit and φ
S¯
it on x˜
δ
it . However, this non-
uniqueness of payment rules does not impact the necessity
and sufficiency of PBNE-HI because the conditions (22)-
(24) and (27)-(28) can be reformulated to be independent of
payments.
The construction (21) implies that βit can be completely
characterized by σi and εi, given Γi. As a result, the design of
βi can be equivalent to the design of αi and εi. The following
proposition describes the design principle for the relation
between εi and βi.
Proposition 4. Fix σi. Let ri = {ri0 , . . . ,riT } ∈ RT+1 denote
a sequence of payments. Define
Ri[σi,εi]≡
{
ri ∈ RT : E
[
rit +
T−1
∑
s=t
(
φ S,S¯is (xˆis ∨ εi(s))
−φ S,S¯is+1(xˆis+1 ∨ εi(s+1))
)∣∣∣xit = εi(t),σi]= 0}.
The following statements are true.
(1) The mechanism is pBNE-HI i.f.f. {βit (t)}t∈T ∈ Ri[σi,εi],
for any εit (t) ∈ Xit , for all it ∈ It , t ∈ T.
(2) The mechanism is PBNE-HI without β i.f.f. there exists
εi that solves the following equation:
E
[T−1
∑
s=t
(
φS,S¯is (xˆis ∨ εi(s))
−φS,S¯is+1(xˆis+1 ∨ εi(s+1))
)∣∣∣xit = εi(t),σi]= 0
(3) Agent i has no incentive to leave i.f.f. {git (x¯it ;σi)}t∈T
∈ Ri[σi, x¯it ]. There is in general no global posted-
price rule, i.e., βi = β for all i ∈ I, to disincentivize
heterogeneous agents to leave until T , i.e., to prevent
population dynamics.
Proof. See Appendix F.
A. Relaxation of CP’s Problem
To exactly solve the CP’s mechanism design problem (16),
the following criteria have to be satisfied: (1) PBNE-HI,
(2) profit maximization, assuming agents’ truthful reporting,
and (3) computational constraints (e.g., scale, accuracy of
approximations). In general, however, the CP’s mechanism
design problem is analytically intractable. Hence, approx-
imations or proper relaxations are usually adopted to the
aforementioned three criteria. Since the scope of this work is
to provide game-theoretic analysis for the implementability,
we put the design of efficient algorithms to approximate the
CP’s problem in our future work and provide examples of
relaxations of the game-theoretic constrains.
Assumption 3. For any xit , x′it ∈ Xit with xit ≤ x′it , x−it ∈Xit ,
and xit+1 ∈ Xit+1 , t ∈ T\T , the following holds:
Fit+1(xit+1 |xt ,σit (xt ,x−it ))≤ Fit+1(xit+1 |x′t ,σit (x′t ,x−it )).
Let Πt : I 7→ It such that Πt(i) = (pi0 ◦pi1 · · · ◦pit)(i) = it ,
for all i ∈ I, t ∈ T, with Π−1t (it) = i.
Lemma 3. Suppose uit is non-decreasing in xit , for
all it ∈ It , t ∈ T and Assumption 3 holds. Then,
E
[
Ci0(xi0 ,τ
∗
i0 ;σΠ−10 (i0))|σΠ−10 (i0)
]
≥ 0 implies the PC con-
straint in (16).
Based on Lemma 3, we relax the CP’s problem (16) by
making E
[
Ci0(xi0 ,τ
∗
i0 ;σΠ−10 (i0))|σΠ−10 (i0)
]
= 0 and addition-
ally making the CP to make decisions at a stationary point,
i.e., the necessary conditions of PBNE-HI are satisfied. The
relaxed problem is as follows:
max
σ ,ε
C0 = E
[
∑
t∈T\τ∗
u0,t
(
xˆt ,σ t(xˆt)
)
+ ∑
i0∈I,τi0∈τ ∗
τi0
∑
t=0,it=Πt (i0)
uit (xˆit ,σit (xˆt))
− ∑
i0∈I,τi0∈τ ∗
τi0
∑
t=0,it=Πt (i0)
∂uit (`,σis(xˆs))(1−Fi0(xˆi0))
∂` fi0(xˆi0)(1/Gi0(xˆi0 t))
∣∣∣
`=xˆt
∣∣∣σ ],
s.t. PBNE-HI.
(29)
Since βit can be characterized by σi and εi given Γi, the
relationship between εt and τi is captured by the definition
τ∗i = E
[
∑Tt=0 tFit (εi(t)|θ˜it−1 ,σit−1(θ˜it−1))
∣∣∣σi]. Let α ∗ and ε ∗
solve (29). Then, ρit , γit , and βit can be constructed by
(19)-(21), respectively. Analytical relaxations of DIC may
be used when there are computational burdens to check
the DIC conditions given specific mathematical descriptions
of economic model. Analytical relaxations can be imposed
by reducing the necessity or the sufficiency of PBNE-HI
such that the relaxed conditions imply the original ones. For
example, the following two conditions imply (22)-(23) by
reducing the necessity, respectively:[
hit (t,yit ;σi)−hit (t,xit ;yit ,σi)
][
yit − xit
]≥ 0, (30)[
sup
τ∈Tt+1
hit (τ,xit ;yit ,σi)− sup
τ∈Tt
hit (τ,yit ;σi)
][
yit − xit
]
≤ sup
τ∈Tt+1
{
max
τ ′∈Tτ
βiτ ′ (τ
′)+
[
hit (τ,yit ;σi)−hit (xit ;yit ,σi)
][
yit − xit
]}
.
(31)
Computational constraints and intractability of (29) may
require approximation techniques to compute sub-optimal
solutions, which may inevitably violate the PBNE-HI. Typ-
ical computational relaxations of the incentive compatibility
(IC) involves considering δ -IC (δt -DIC in our case) that
requires no agent can improve his payoff more than δ ≥ 0
when he misreports his private information. The conditions
of PBNE-HI can be used to measure the (violation) of DIC of
any computationally relaxed mechanisms, which is an active
research agenda in algorithmic mechanism design.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we have presented a dynamic mechanism
design problem for resource allocation to multiple self-
interested agents in a dynamic environment due to agent’s
learning-by-doing and the adoption of stopping rules. The
mechanism consists of an allocation rule and three payment
rules. One of the payment rule that is independent of agents’
private preference is used to directly influence the population
dynamics. We have defined the notion of honesty elicitation
to describe the scenario where each agent is incentivized
to truthfully reveal his true preference to the central planner
and follow an optimal stopping rule. Necessary and sufficient
conditions are established for the implementability of hon-
esty elicitation under the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
We have presented two approaches to relax the mechanism
design problem by (1) modifying the central planner’s ex-
pected payoff and (2) relaxing the necessity of PBNE-HI.
APPENDIX
Let xˆ−it and x−it denote the preference (random variable)
and its period-t realization of all agents other than agent it .
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We omit the only if part that can be proved straightfor-
wardly by following the optimality of honesty. We prove
the if part by contradiction. Suppose that the truthful re-
porting strategy α∗i satisfies (11) for any one-shot deviation
reporting strategy α˜i,(t) at period t, but it does not satisfy
(10). This means that there exists another reporting strategy
α1i = {α1it}t∈T and a preference xit such that Vit (xit ;α1i ,σi)>
Vit (xit ;σi). Let ζ ∗i [α∗i ] and ζ ∗i [α1i ] be the optimal stopping
rules with α∗i and α1i , respectively. Suppose that ζ ∗i [α∗i ] calls
for stopping at period t but ζ ∗i [α1i ] calls for continuing; i.e.
Cit (xit , t;σi)< E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;α
1
i ,σi)
∣∣∣α1i ,σi].
Then, we can find some η > 0 such that
E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;α
1
i ,σi)
∣∣∣α1i ,σi]≥Cit (xit , t;σi)+2η . (32)
Let α2i = {α2it}t∈T be any reporting strategy. Suppose that
α2is = α
1
is , for all s ∈ Tt,t+k, for some k > 0 and
E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;α
2
i ,σi)
∣∣∣α2i ,σi]
≥E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;α
1
i ,σi)
∣∣∣α1i ,σi]−η . (33)
Then, we have the following from (32) and (33):
Cit (xit , t;σi)+η ≤ E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;α
2
i ,σi)
∣∣∣α2i ,σi]. (34)
Let α¯i|t,t+k = {α¯it}t∈T be any reporting strategy such that
α¯is = α2is , for all s ∈ Tt,t+k and α¯is = α∗is for all s ∈ T\Tt,t+k,
for some k > 0. From (34), we can see that using α¯i|t,t+k as
a way to deviate from honesty is enough to gain profit.
Let α3i|s = {α3it}t∈T be the one-shot deviation reporting
strategy at period s ∈ Tt,t+k, for k > 0, such that α3is = α2is .
From (34), we have
Cit (xit , t;σi)< E
[
Vit+1(xˆit+1 ;α
3
i|t+k−1,σi)
∣∣∣α3i|t+k−1,σi]. (35)
Let t ′ = t+ k. For all xit′ ∈ Xit′−1 , we have
Vit′−1(xit′−1 ;α
3
i|t ′−2,σi)
=E
[
Vit′−1(xˆit′−1 ;α
3
i|t ′−2,σi)
∣∣∣α3i|t ′−2,σi], (36)
and
Vit′−1(xit′−1 ;α
3
i|t ′−1,σi) =max
(
Cit′−1(xit′−1 , t
′−1;α3i|t ′−1,σi),
E
[
Vit′ (xˆit′ ;α
3
i|t ′−1,σi)
∣∣∣α3i|t ′−1,σi]).
(37)
Then, since α∗i satisfy (11), we have
Vit′−1(xit′−1 ;α
3
i,t ′−2,σi)≥Vit′−1(xit′−1 ;α3i,t ′−1,σi) (38)
Hence, (36)-(38) imply
E
[
Vit−1(xˆit−1 ;α
3
i|t ′−2,σi)
∣∣∣α3i|t ′−2,σi]
≥E
[
Vit−1(xˆt−1;α
3
it′−1 ,σi)
∣∣∣α3i|t ′−1,σi].
(39)
From (35), we have
E
[
Vit−1(xˆit−1 ;α
3
i|t ′−2,σi)
∣∣∣α3i|t ′−2,σi]>Cit (xit , t;σi). (40)
Hence, we can use backward induction to obtain the follow-
ing:
E
[
Vit−1(xˆit−1 ;α
3
i|t ,σi)
∣∣∣α3i|t ,σi]>Cit (xit , t;σi),
which contradicts the fact that α∗i satisfies (11).
We can use the similar procedures for the following cases:
those are (1) ζ ∗i [α∗i ] calls for stopping and ζ ∗i [α1i ] calls to
stopping, (2) ζ ∗i [α∗i ] calls for continuing and ζ ∗i [α1i ] calls to
continuing, and (3) ζ ∗i [α∗i ] calls for continuing and ζ ∗i [α1i ]
calls to stop. The one-shot deviation principle can then be
proved.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose there exist two threshold function ε ′i 6= εi. Let ζ ε
′
i
and ζ εi be the optimal stopping rule in PBNE-HI with respect
to ε ′i and εi, respectively. As defined in (12), let τεit (xit ) and
τε ′it (xit ) be corresponding to ζ
ε
i and ζ
ε ′
i , respectively. Suppose
τε ′it (xit ) = τ
ε
it (xit ), for xit ∈ Xit , t ∈T. Assume without loss of
generality εi(t)< ε ′i (t) for some t ∈ T. Then, we have
Pr(τεit (xˆit ) = t) =Pr(xit ≤ εi(t),τεit−1(xˆit−1)> t−1)
=E
[
E
[
1{xˆit≤εi(t)}
∣∣∣Γit]1{xˆit−1>εi(t−1)}∣∣∣Γit−1],
where the interim process in the expectation are used to indi-
cate the how the expectation is the measured. Pr(τε
′
it (xˆit ) = t)
can be determined in the similar way. Hence,
Pr(τε
′
it (xˆit ) = t)−Pr(τεit (xˆit ) = t)
=E
[
E
[
1{xˆit≤ε ′i (t)}
∣∣∣Γit]1{xˆit−1>ε ′i (t−1)}∣∣∣Γit−1]
−E
[
E
[
1{xˆit≤εi(t)}
∣∣∣Γit]1{xˆit−1>εi(t−1)}∣∣∣Γit−1]
=E
[
E
[
1{εi(t)≤xˆit≤ε ′i (t)}
∣∣∣Γit]1{τεit−1 (xˆit )>t−1}∣∣∣Γit−1].
(41)
Since τε ′it (xit ) = τ
ε
it (xit ), Pr(τ
ε ′
it (xˆit ) = t)−Pr(τεit (xˆit ) = t) = 0.
However, since fit (xit ) > 0 for all xit ∈ Xit , t ∈ T, the right
hand side of (41) is non zero, which provides a contradiction.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Define
JSit (xit ; x˜it ,σi) =uit (xit ,σit (x˜it , xˆ−it ))+ γit (x˜it ,x−it )+βit (t),
(42)
and
JS¯it (xit ; x˜it ,σi) =uit (xit ,σit (x˜it , xˆ−it ))+ γit (x˜it ,x−it )
+git (xit ; x˜it ,σi).
(43)
From the constructions of γit in (20), we can represent JSit in
terms of the characterizing functions as follows:
JSit (xit ; x˜it ,σi) =uit (xit ,σit (x˜it ,x−it ))−uit (x˜it ,σit (x˜it ,x−it ))
+φ Sit (x˜it |σi)+βit (t).
(44)
From the definitions of the distance function dSit in (17), we
have
JSit (xit ; x˜it ,σi) =φ
S
it (x˜it |σi)+βit (t)−dSit (x˜it ,xit ;σi)
≤φ Sit (xit |σi)+βit (t) From (22)
=uit (xit ,σit (xit ,xit ))+ γit (xit ,xit )+βit (t)
=JSit (xit ;xit ,σi).
(45)
For JS¯it , we first re-write it as follows:
JS¯it (xit ; x˜it ,σi)
=uit (xit ,σit (x˜it ,xit ))+ρit (x˜it ,xit ))−βit (t)
+ sup
τit∈Tt+1
{
E
[
φ S¯t+1(xˆit+1 |σi)−φ S¯iτit (xˆiτit )
+φ Siτit
(xˆiτit )+βiτit (τit )
∣∣∣x˜it ,σi]}
= sup
τi∈Tt+1
E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+
τi−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis , xˆ−is)
+ γiτi (xˆiτi , xˆ−iτi )+βiτi (τi)
∣∣∣x˜it ,σi]∣∣∣xˆit=xit .
(46)
The construction of ρit in (19) yields
R.H.S of (46)
= sup
τi∈Tt+1
{
E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆt ,σis(xˆt , xˆ−is))
+ γτi(xˆτi , xˆ−iτi )|x˜it ,σi
]∣∣∣
xˆit=xit
+φ S¯it (x˜it )
−E
[
φ S¯τi(xˆτi)+
τi−1
∑
s=t
uis(xˆt ,σis(xˆt , xˆ−is))
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
xˆit=x˜it
+βτi(τi)
}
≤ sup
τi∈Tt+1
{
E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆt ,σis(xˆt , xˆ−is))
+ γτi(xˆτi , xˆ−iτi )|x˜it ,σi
]∣∣∣
xˆit=xit
+φ S¯it (x˜it )
−E
[
φ S¯τi(xˆτi)+
τi−1
∑
s=t
uis(xˆt ,σis(xˆt , xˆ−is))
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
xˆit=x˜it
+ max
τ∈Tτit
βτ(τ).
}
,
(47)
From the definition (18) and condition (24), we have
R.H.S. of (47)≤φ S¯it (x˜it )− sup
τi∈Tt+1
{
dS¯it (x˜tt ,xt ,τi;σi)
}
. (48)
Then, condition (23) yields
R.H.S. of (48)≤ φ S¯it (xit ). (49)
From the construction of ρit in (19) and condition (24), we
have, for any τi ∈ Tt+1,
R.H.S. of (49)≤E
[ T
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+
T−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis , xˆ−is)
+ γiT (xˆiT , xˆ−iT )
∣∣∣σi]
xˆit=xit
=E
[ τ
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+
τ−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis , xˆ−is)
+ρiτ +
T
∑
k=τ+1
uk +
T−1
∑
k=τ+1
ρk
+ γiT (xˆiT , xˆ−iT )
∣∣∣σi]
xˆit=xit
(50)
From the construction of βit in (21) and Lemma 4, we
have,
E.H.S. of 50 ≤E
[ τ
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+ γiτ (xˆit , xˆ−it )+βiτ (τ)
∣∣∣σi]
xˆit=xit
≤ sup
τi∈Tt
{
E
[ τ
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+ γiτ (xˆit , xˆ−it )+βiτ (τ)
∣∣∣σi]
xˆit=xit
}
,
which implies
JS¯it (xit ; x˜it ,σi)≤ JS¯it (xit ;xit ,σi). (51)
Combining (45) and (51), we can show that (11) is estab-
lished.
Lemma 4. Suppose Assumptions 2 hold. Then, git (xit ;σi) is
non-decreasing in xit , for all t ∈ T.
Proof. Define
Mit (xit ; x˜it ,σi)≡E
[
uit+1(xˆit+1 ,σit+1(xˆt+1))+ γit+1(xˆt+1)
+βit+1(t+1)
∣∣∣α˜it ,σi]+ρit (x˜it ,x−it )
− γit (x˜it ,x−it ),
(52)
with Mit (xit ;σi) = Mit (xit ;xit ,σi), such that Mit (xit ;σi) −
βit (t) is the change in agent it ’s expected payoffs between
when he continues and plans to stop at t + 1 and he stops
immediately at t. Then, agent it ’s period-t interim expected
payoff can be represented in terms of Mit as follows:
Cit (xit ,τit ;σi) = E
[ τit−1
∑
s=t
Mis(xˆis ;σi)−βis(s)
∣∣∣σi]
+Cit (xit , t;σi).
(53)
Hence, git in (13) can be rewritten as follows:
git (xit ;σi) = sup
τit∈Tt+1
E
[ τit−1
∑
s=t
Mis(xˆis ;σi)−βis(s)
∣∣∣σi]
+Mit (xit ;σi).
(54)
Assumption 2 implies that Mit is non-decreasing in xit , for
all t ∈ T. Hence, (54) leads to that git is non-decreasing in
xit , for all t ∈ T.
D. Proof of Lemma 2
Due to the dynamics of agent’s preference, current-period
reporting of preference will influence the distribution of
future preferences of that agent.
Let xit ∈ Xit and xit+1 ∈ Xit+1 be any realized preferences
in any two adjacent periods. From (2), we have that there
exists ωit+1 ∈ (0,1) such that
xit+1 = κit+1(xit ,σit (xit ,x−it ),ωit+1). (55)
Applying the envelope theorem in PBNE-HI mechanism
yields the following:
∂xit+1
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
=
∂κit+1(`,σit (xit ,x−it ),ωit+1)
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
. (56)
From the definition of κit in (1), we have
∂xit+1
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
=
∂F−1it+1(ωit+1 |`,σit (xit ,x−it ))
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
=
−∂Fit+1(xt+1|xt ,σit (xit ,x−it ))/∂`
fit+1(xit+1 |xit ,σit (xit ,x−it ))
∣∣∣
`=xit
.
(57)
Similarly, for any sequence of realizations of preferences,
< xt ,xt+1, . . . ,xk, . . .xT >, we have, for any t < k ≤ T ,
∂xik
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
=
s
∏
k=t+1
−∂Fik(xˆik |`,σik−1(xˆk−1))
fik(xˆik |xˆik−1 ,σik−1(xˆk−1))∂`
∣∣∣
`=xik−1
. (58)
In any PBNE-HI mechanism < σ ,ρ ,γ ,beta >, truthful
reporting strategy is optimal for all agents. Then, from the
envelope theorem, we have
∂Jit (`,τit ;σi)
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
=E
[ τit
∑
s=t
∂uis(`,σis(xˆis))
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xˆis
∂ xˆis
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
]
=−Et
[ τit
∑
s=t
∂uis(`,σis(xˆs))
∂`
|`=xˆis
s
∏
k=t+1
−∂Fik(xˆik |`,σik−1(xˆk−1))
fik(xˆik |xˆik−1 ,σik−1(xˆk−1))∂`
∣∣∣
`=xik−1
∣∣∣σi].
(59)
E. Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to verify that the constructions of φ Sit and φ
S¯
it in
(27) and (28), respectively, satisfy the sufficient conditions
in Proposition 3. Hence, the sufficiency can be proved in the
similar way as in Appendix (C), so we omit it here and focus
on the necessity part.
1) Optimal stopping rule calls for stopping: xit ≤ εi(t):
Let x˜it ∈ Xit . Without loss of generality, suppose x˜it ≤ xit .
Let x1it ∈ Xit . To simplify the notation, we omit other agents’
preferences unless otherwise stated. Since the mechanism
< σ ,ρ ,γ ,β > is PBNE-HI, we have
uit (xit ,σi(xit ))+ γit (xit )+βit (t)
≥ uit (xit ,σi(xˆit ))+ γit (xˆit )+βit (t).
(60)
Define
HSit (x
1
it )≡ sup
x∈Xit
{
uit (x
1
it ,σi(x))+ γit (x)
}
.
Clearly, PBNE-HI implies that
x1it ∈ argx∈Xit sup
{
uit (x
1
it ,σi(x))+ γit (x)
}
.
Then, the differentiability implies
HSit (xit )−HSit (x˜it ) =
∫ xit
x˜
∂HSit (`)
∂`
d`. (61)
From the envelope theorem, we have
∂HSit (`)
∂`
∣∣∣
`=xit
=
∂
∂`
[
uit (`,σit (xit ))+ γit (xit ))
]∣∣∣
`=xit
=
∂
∂`
[
uit (`,σit (xit ))
]∣∣∣
`=xit
=Bis(xit ; t).
(62)
Hence,
φ Sit (xit )−φ Sit (x˜it ) =HSit (xit )−HSit (x˜it )
=uit (xit ,σit (xit ))+ γit (xit )
−uit (x˜it ,σit (x˜it ))− γit (x˜it )
The definition of distance gives
dSit (xit , x˜it ;σi) =uit (xit ,σit (xit ))−uit (x˜it ,σit (xit ))
=uit (xit ,σit (xit ))−uit (x˜it ,σit (x˜it ))
+uit (x˜it ,σit (x˜it ))−uit (x˜it ,σit (xit ))
≥uit (xit ,σit (xit ))−uit (x˜it ,σit (x˜it ))
− γit (x˜it )+ γit (xit )
=φ Sit (xit )−φ Sit (x˜it ).
2) Optimal stopping rule calls for continuing: xit ≥ εit (t)::
Similarly, PBNE-HI imples the following:
uit (xit ,σit (xit ))+ γit (xit )+git (xit ;σi)
≥uit (xit ,σit (x˜it ))+ γit (x˜it )+git (xit ; x˜it ,σi).
Define
H S¯it (x
1
it )≡ sup
x∈Xit
{
uit (xit ,σit (x))+ γit (x)+git (xit ;x,σi)
}
.
PBNE-HI implies
x1it ∈ argx∈Xit
{
uit (xit ,σit (x))+ γit (x)+git (xit ;x,σi)
}
.
After applying the envelope to H S¯it , we obtain the follow-
ing:
φ S¯it (x˜it |σi)−φ S¯it (xit |σi) = H S¯it (x˜it )−H S¯it (xit )
=uit (xit ,σit (xit ))+ γit (xit )+git (xit ;σi)
−uit (x˜it ,σit (x˜it ))− γit (x˜it )−git (x˜it ;σi).
(63)
By expanding git , we have
R.H.S. of (63) = sup
τit∈Tt+1
{
E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+ γiτit (xˆiτit )
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
xˆit=x˜t
+βiτit (τit )
+E
[ τit−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis)
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
αit (x˜it )=x˜t
}
− sup
τit∈Tt+1
{
E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))+ γiτit (xˆiτit )
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
xˆit=xt
+βiτit (τit )+E
[ τit−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis)
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
αit (xit )=xt
}
.
(64)
Then we have the following:
R.H.S. of (64)≤ sup
τit∈Tt+1
{
E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+ γiτit (xˆiτit )
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
xˆit=x˜t
+E
[ τit−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis)
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
αit (x˜it )=x˜t
−E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))+ γiτit (xˆiτit )
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
xˆit=xt
−E
[ τit−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis)
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
αit (xit )=xt
}
.
(65)
PBNE-HI implies
R.H.S. of (65)≤ sup
τit∈Tt+1
{
E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+ γiτit (xˆiτit )
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
xˆit=x˜t
+E
[ τit−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis)
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
αit (x˜it )=x˜t
−E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))+ γiτit (xˆiτit )
∣∣∣x˜it ,σi]∣∣∣xˆit=xt
−E
[ τit−1
∑
s=t
ρis(xˆis)
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
αit (xit )=x˜t
}
≤ sup
τit∈Tt+1
{
E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))
+ γiτit (xˆiτit )
∣∣∣σi]∣∣∣
xˆit=x˜t
−E
[ τi
∑
s=t
uis(xˆis ,σis(xˆis , xˆ−is))+ γiτit (xˆiτit )
∣∣∣x˜it ,σi]∣∣∣xˆit=xt
}
+ max
τ∈Tτit
βτ(τ).
(66)
Then, from the definition of distance function dS¯it , we have
R.H.S of (66) = sup
τit∈Tt+1
{
dS¯it (x˜it ,xit ,τit ;σi)
}
.
Hence, we obtain supτit∈Tt+1
{
dSit (x˜it ,xit ;τit ,σi)
}
≥
φ S¯it (x˜it |σi)−φ S¯it (xit |σi).
F. Proof of Proposition 4
1) Statement (1) and (2): Fix a σi. If the mechanism <
σ ,ρ ,γ ,β > is PBNE-HI, then any posted price sequence ri
produced by βi with εi satisfies the construction of βi given
in (21) due to Theorem 1.
For the converse direction, let β ′i be the rule for agent
i in a PBNE-HI mechanism, with r′i = β ′i (< 0, . . . ,T >)
and the corresponding unique threshold rule εi. Suppose
r′i 6∈ Ri[σi,εi], e.g.,
rit ≡
{
ri ∈ RT : E
[
rit +
T−1
∑
s=t
(
φ S,S¯is (xˆis ∨ εi(s))
−φ S,S¯is+1(xˆis+1 ∨ εi(s+1))
)∣∣∣xit = εi(t),σi]= 0},
which implies that there exists some q> 0, such that
βit (t)+q = git (xit ;σi). (67)
Suppose agent i’s period-t realized preference is xit ≤ εi(t).
Then truthful reporting and stopping immediately gives agent
i the expected payoff
Cit (xit , t;σi) =
t−1
∑
s=0
uis(xis ,σis(xis ,x−is))+ρis(xis ,x−is))
+uit (xit ,σit (xit ,x−it ))+ γit (xit ,x−it ))+βit (t).
From (67), we have
Cit (xit , t;σi)≤
t−1
∑
s=0
uis(xis ,σis(xis ,x−is))+ρis(xis ,x−is))
+uit (xit ,σit (xit ,x−it ))+ γit (xit ,x−it ))+git (xit ;σi),
which incentivizes agent it to continue, which contradits the
optimality of stopping rule.
Statement (2) can be proved by setting βit (t) = 0 for all
it ∈ It , t ∈ T.
2) Statement (3): To make all agents non-stop at all
intermediate periods t ∈ T0,T−1, the posted-price payment
rule β has to impose the threshold function εi(t) = x¯it , for
all it ∈ It , t ∈T, i.e., {git (x¯it ;σi)}t∈T ∈Ri[σi, x¯it ], for all it ∈ It ,
t ∈ T. We can prove this in the similar way as that for
statements (1) and (2).
Suppose the CP uses a global rule βi = β , for all i∈ I, with
εi(t) = x¯it , for all it ∈ It , t ∈ T, which produces a sequence
of posted price r =< r0, . . . ,rT >. Then, the mechanism
is PBNE-HI if and only if {git (x¯it ;σi)}t∈T ∈ Ri[σi, x¯it ], or
equivalently,
rt ≡
{
ri ∈ RT :E
[
rit +
T−1
∑
s=t
(
φ S,S¯is (x¯is)
−φ S,S¯is+1(x¯is+1)
)∣∣∣xit = x¯it ,σi]= 0}.
REFERENCES
[1] M. H. Moradi, S. Razini, and S. M. Hosseinian, “State of art of
multiagent systems in power engineering: A review,” Renewable and
Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 58, pp. 814–824, 2016.
[2] T. Kaihara, “Multi-agent based supply chain modelling with dynamic
environment,” International Journal of Production Economics, vol. 85,
no. 2, pp. 263–269, 2003.
[3] K. Tuyls and G. Weiss, “Multiagent learning: Basics, challenges, and
prospects,” AI Magazine, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 41–41, 2012.
[4] E. Ephrati and J. S. Rosenschein, “The clarke tax as a consensus
mechanism among automated agents.” in AAAI, vol. 91, 1991, pp.
173–178.
[5] P. Vytelingum, T. D. Voice, S. D. Ramchurn, A. Rogers, and N. R.
Jennings, “Agent-based micro-storage management for the smart grid,”
2010.
[6] W. Vickrey, “Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed
tenders,” Journal of Finance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 8–37.
[7] A. Pavan, I. R. Segal, and J. Toikka, “Dynamic mechanism design:
Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclo-
sure,” Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure (May 1, 2009),
2009.
[8] S. Athey and I. Segal, “An efficient dynamic mechanism,” Economet-
rica, vol. 81, no. 6, pp. 2463–2485, 2013.
[9] L. Lova´sz and P. Winkler, “Efficient stopping rules for markov chains,”
in Proc. 27th ACM Symp. on the Theory of Computing. Citeseer, 1995.
[10] R. Lundgren and D. S. Silvestrov, “Optimal stopping and reselling
of european options,” in Mathematical and statistical models and
methods in reliability. Springer, 2010, pp. 371–389.
[11] R. B. Myerson, “Optimal auction design,” Mathematics of operations
research, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 58–73, 1981.
[12] G. Peskir and A. Shiryaev, Optimal stopping and free-boundary
problems. Springer, 2006.
[13] S. Villeneuve, “On threshold strategies and the smooth-fit principle for
optimal stopping problems,” Journal of Applied Probability, vol. 44,
no. 1, pp. 181–198, 2007.
[14] T. Kruse and P. Strack, “An inverse optimal stopping problem for
diffusion processes,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 44,
no. 2, pp. 423–439, 2018.
[15] M. Jaskowski and D. van Dijk, “First-passage-time in discrete time
and intra-horizon risk measures,” 2016, (preliminary version).
